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Abstract— A measure of privacy infringement for agents (or
participants) travelling across a transportation network in
participatory-sensing schemes for traffic estimation is intro-
duced. The measure is defined to be the conditional probability
that an external observer assigns to the private nodes in
the transportation network, e.g., location of home or office,
given all the position measurements that it broadcasts over
time. An algorithm for finding an optimal trade-off between the
measure of privacy infringement and the expected estimation
error, captured by the number of the nodes over which the
participant stops broadcasting its position, is proposed. The
algorithm searches over a family of policies in which an agent
stops transmitting its position measurements if its distance
(in terms of the number of hops) to the privacy sensitive
node is smaller than a prescribed threshold. Employing such
symmetric policies are advantageous in terms of the resources
required for implementation and the ease of computation. The
results are expanded to more general policies. Further, the
effect of the heterogeneity of the population density on the
optimal policy is explored. Finally, the relationship between
the betweenness measure of centrality and the optimal privacy-
preserving policy of the agents is numerically explored.
I. INTRODUCTION
A sharp rise in the number of the networked platforms,
such as smart phones and wearable gadgets, has enabled
new technologies, such as participatory-sensing schemes,
to be commercially viable. In these schemes, agents (or
participants) and their networked devices act as sensing units
to estimate a variable of interest. Waze1 and Mobile Mil-
lennium2 can be mentioned as examples of commercial and
academic products that use participatory-sensing schemes for
measuring the traffic flow in real time. These systems often
recruit agents that are willing to provide data (by directly
providing reports or letting the sensors on their devices to
be remotely used). However, gathering data usually reveals
some private information about the agents (e.g., the location
of their house or office among many other variables), which
might make them opt out of the system or switch off their
connected devices (more often than needed). One way to
alleviate the privacy related anxieties of the agents is to “sys-
tematically corrupt” the measurements collected by them.
The objective of such corruption is to obfuscate the private
information of each agent. A direct link between the intensity
of corruption and the quality of the estimate, on the one hand,
and the availability of the private information, on the other
hand, can be established. This observation is at the core of
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the literature on differential privacy (see [1]–[5] among other
studies), where the responses to statistical queries on random
databases are typically corrupted by Laplace noise to protect
the privacy of the individuals in the database.
In transportation systems, differential privacy might not
be well-suited for preserving the privacy of the agents. To
demonstrate this, as an example, consider a scenario in
which the networked devices of the agents in a participatory-
sensing scheme provide Global Positioning System (GPS)
measurements of their position in equidistant intervals of
time. From the perspective of a subscribing agents, the
privacy infringement is only an issue if the agent is close
to a privacy sensitive node3, such as its home or office.
Therefore, when travelling through most of the network,
transmitting accurate measurements of its position is not
infringing the privacy of the agent (and thus the addition
of the noise is conservative). In addition, if an agent is
staying in a certain node for long durations of time (e.g.,
over night at home or during work hours at office), a simple
averaging can significantly reduce the effect of any additive
noise on the position measurements and, thus, revealing
the position of private nodes. Hence, adding noise to the
sensor measurements (at least indiscriminately with respect
to the position) to protect the privacy of the agent is neither
necessary nor beneficial. Therefore, a different approach is
required for protecting the privacy of the agents in which
they completely stop broadcasting their position based on
their proximity to the private nodes. Such a method can
form the basis of a software package that gives rise to the
democratization of privacy-preserving tools and measures in
transportation networks. The software simply asks for the
privacy requirements of the agents and automatically turns
off their GPS units if they are closer than an optimally
selected level to their private nodes. Note that this proposal
is not the novel aspect of this paper. Many commercial
softwares provide similar (but application-specific) solutions.
For instance, Strava4 enables users (mainly runners and
cyclists) to construct a privacy zone (by specifying a position
and radius) in which the GPS location of the user is not
reported and is thus not revealed to a third-party5. Though
undoubtedly powerful in preserving privacy of the users over
one single trip, such zones might prove ineffective in the
3A rational agent, which is privacy-conscious enough to not want its path
to be recorded at all, simply does not participate in the scheme.
4http://www.strava.com/
5Thieves have used such measurements to steal valuable bikes. http:
//www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11372189/
Cycling-apps-put-you-at-risk-from-hi-tech-burglars.
html
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long run. For instance, imagine that the same user gets out
of its privacy zone in three different locations (on three
different occasions). Now, equipped with the knowledge
that the user’s house is in the same distance from these
three positions (without even knowing that distance), a well-
resourced attacker can simply pinpoint the position of the
house of the user by triangulation. Therefore, more careful
design strategies are required to protect the privacy of the
users. This paper provides a provably privacy-preserving
method for constructing the privacy zones based on the
underlying transportation network.
In this paper, first, a measure of privacy infringement
for the agents is introduced. The measure is equal to the
conditional probability that an external observer assigns
to the private nodes of the agent given all its position
measurements over time. By carefully selecting the set of
nodes and edges over which the agent does not transmit its
position, it can effectively reduce this conditional probability
to mislead the maximum likelihood filters that can be used to
find the location of the private nodes. However, this can only
be achieved at the cost of not reporting the position at some
nodes in the network, which would reduce the quality of
the estimation provided by the participatory-sensing scheme.
An algorithm to find an optimal trade-off between these two
competing interests is provided. The algorithm searches over
a family of policies in which the agent stops broadcasting
its position measurements if its distance in terms of the
number of hops to the private nodes is smaller than a level.
Employing such symmetric policies are advantageous as they
are easy to compute and to implement. This is due to the
fact that the agent only needs to count the number of the
nodes on its path and does not require a map of the city.
However, they have a drawback because an agent that uses
a symmetric policy should exclude a larger subgraph from
its measurements to achieve the same level of privacy as
an agent that does not restrict itself to such policies. The
results are subsequently expanded to more general (possibly
asymmetric) policies. The effect of the population density is
then explored. The impact of the betweenness measure of
centrality of the private nodes of an agent on the policy of
that agent is numerically explored on a random geometric
graph. The betweenness measure of centrality for a node
is defined as the number of the shortest paths in the graph
that pass through that node divided by the total number of
the shortest paths [6, p. 39]. Intuitively, a node with a high
betweenness measure connects many nodes to each other
(and is thus very central). However, a node with a low
betweenness measure can be removed from the graph with
no devastating consequences. It is observed numerically that,
for the node with the maximum betweenness in a random
geometric graph, a fairly large exclusion radius should be
selected to reduce the measure of the privacy infringement.
In addition, by slightly increasing the radius of the exclusion
zone, the number of the nodes and edges over which the
agent stop its broadcasting its position measurements rapidly
increases. The opposite behaviour is witnessed for the node
with the minimum betweenness. Finally, the results are
demonstrated on the City of Melbourne (the center of the
Melbourne metropolitan area).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. This section
is concluded by presenting some useful notations. Section II
introduces the privacy measure and mathematically formu-
lates the problem. Section III provides an algorithm for
finding a symmetric policy that balances between the need
for privacy and the quality of the estimation. Section IV
extend the results to asymmetric policies. The effect of
the heterogeneity of the population density is explored in
Section V. The numerical examples are illustrated and their
implications are discussed in Section VI. Finally, the paper
is concluded in Section VII.
A. Notations
Consider an undirected G = (V, E), where V is the vertex
set and E ⊆ V × V is the edge set. An undirected edge
between nodes i, j ∈ V is denoted by {i, j}. A walk is a
sequence v1, e1, v2, e2, . . . , ek−1, vk of vertices vi ∈ G and
edges ei ∈ E such that ei = (vi, vi+1) for all i < k. The
vertices v1 and vk are called the initial and the terminal
vertices of the walk, respectively. The length of the walk
is the number of edges in it. A path is a walk in which
all vertices are distinct. The distance d(i, j) between two
vertices i, j ∈ V is the length of a shortest path with initial
vertex i and terminal vertex j. Additionally, define the set
of nodes with a distance δ from node i by Di(δ) where
Di(δ) = {j|j ∈ V, d(i, j) = δ}. The length of the longest
shortest path between any two vertices of a graph is the
graph’s diameter.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A transportation network, or simply a network, is mod-
elled by an undirected graph G = (V, E), where the nodes
and the edges represent the intersections and the road seg-
ments, respectively. Consider a set of mobile agents, denoted
by A, that traverse throughout the network along its edges.
The agents are participating in a passive6 participatory-
sensing scheme to estimate the state of the traffic (i.e., the
number of the vehicles7 on each edge) in the network. Each
agent a ∈ A is assumed to visit all nodes in V at least
once8. Any agent a ∈ A can choose whether to broadcast
its position or not. In case of deciding not to broadcast
the position, it can simply turn off the GPS sensor on
its connected device or terminate the participatory-sensing
application. Assume that agent a does not want an external
6The term passive refers to the fact that the agents are not required to
report traffic incidents (e.g., as in Waze). The participatory-sensing scheme
receives GPS measurements of the agents at different times to construct an
estimate of the traffic flow. An example of such a system can be found
in [7].
7Note that there might be many more vehicles than agents since not
everyone is participating in the sensing scheme.
8For this assumption to be satisfied, it is only required that the agents visit
any node by a non-zero probability (no matter how small). Then, as time
goes to infinity, the agents visit all nodes with probability one. Removing
this assumption can make the observer’s task at determining the private
nodes of an agent harder. Therefore, this analysis can be used as a worst-
case analysis of the privacy preserving policies for the agents.
observer (with access to all its position measurements) to
be able to determine if it has ever visited a prescribed set
of nodes denoted by Sa ⊆ V . This set is assumed to be
only known by agent a. The nodes sa ∈ Sa are termed the
private nodes for agent a. For the sake of the simplicity of
exposition, assume that Sa = {sa} for some sa ∈ V . The
results of this paper can be easily generalized to the case
that Sa is not a singleton (so long as the elements of Sa are
“far enough” from each other on the graph).
Assume that the observer has a uniform prior on privacy
sensitive node sa of agent a. This assumption is removed
later in the paper to account for the heterogeneity of the
population density. Given the positions that the agent has
broadcast (and the time stamp of those positions), the ob-
server can construct the conditional probability pa(v) that
node v belongs to the set Sa. Agent a ∈ A wants to keep
the conditional probability pia := pa(sa) for sa ∈ Sa small.
This way, the observer does not have a good chance for
correctly inferring that the agent has visited the node sa.
Therefore, this conditional probability can be seen as a mea-
sure of privacy infringement for agent a. However, the agents
want to achieve this goal with not drastically degrading the
performance of the participatory-sensing scheme. Note that,
if such a constraint is not enforced, the best policy of an
agent is to never broadcast its position.
Throughout this paper, agent a is assumed to follow a
policy that instructs it to stop broadcasting its position when
it is on a link {i, j} if d(i, sa) ≤ ha or d(j, sa) ≤ ha for
sa ∈ Sa, where ha ∈ N is a prescribed integer number
that is only known by agent a. The goal is to find ha
optimally. Such a policy is favoured (in comparison to more
general asymmetric ones) as it can be easily implemented: it
does not require a map of the city. The agent simply stops
broadcasting when its hop-distance to its private node, sa, is
smaller than ha.
As described earlier, the agents do not want to drastically
degrade the quality of the participatory-sensing scheme. Let
E(sa, ha) denote the set of edges over which agent a stop
broadcasting its position. It can be shown that
E(sa, ha) = {{i, j} ∈ E | d(i, sa) ≤ ha ∨ d(j, sa) ≤ ha}.
This is inversely proportional to the quality of the estimation
as, in many sensing schemes (e.g., the least mean square
method), the covariance of the estimation error reduces
by increasing the number of the measurements. Therefore,
agent a may wish to keep ra := |E(sa, ha)| relatively small.
Problem 1: For any agent a ∈ A, find ha to minimize
pia + γara, where the constant γa > 0 is inversely propor-
tional to the importance of privacy for agent a.
For very large constant γa, the cost of the agent behaves
similarly to ra. Therefore, the best policy of the agent is to
report on all edges and, thus, select ha = 0. However, for
very small γ, the cost of the agent is mostly determined
by pia. Thus, the best policy of the agent is to never
broadcast its position or, equivalently, set ha to be larger
than the diameter of G. Alternatively, the agent can solve
B(sa, ha)
Ŝ
: sa ∈ Sa : S˜(sa, ha) : T (sa, ha)
Fig. 1. An illustrative example of the sets Sa, T (sa, ha), S˜(sa, ha),
B(sa, ha), and Ŝ with ha = 1.
the following problem. This problem formulation avoids the
use of a non-intuitive parameter γa.
Problem 2: For any agent a ∈ A, find ha to minimize ra
subject to pia ≤ ξa, where the constant ξa ∈ [0, 1].
If ξa ≤ 1/|V|, the solution of Problem 2 is to select ha
larger than the diameter of G. This is because, upon providing
any position measurements, the conditional probability pia
can only be increased (i.e., only private information can be
leaked by providing measurements). For ξa = 1, the best
policy of the agent is to select ha = 0. In this case, the
agent has a low sensitivity to privacy infringement. A good
aspect of this problem formulation is that the constant ξa can
be intuitively selected based on the meaning of the maximum
tolerable conditional probability pia.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING POLICY
In the light of the aforementioned problem formulation,
an external observer that collects the position broadcasts of
agent a can form the set of nodes T (sa, ha) ⊆ V in which
agent a has transmitted its position. This is because it is
assumed that each agent visits all the nodes in the network.
If the observer waits long enough, the set of all the nodes that
agent a has visited converges to T (sa, ha) with probability
one. Note that
T (sa, ha) = {i ∈ V | d(i, sa) ≥ ha + 1}. (1)
See Fig. 1 for an illustrative example of this set. The
following immediately follows:
sa ∈ S˜(sa, ha) := V \ T (sa, ha). (2)
This is a direct consequence of the selected set of policies.
However, due to the nature of the policy of the agents,
the observer can further remove points from S˜(sa, ha) that
cannot possibly belong to Sa. This is investigated in the
remainder of this section. The boundary of the set T (sa, ha)
interfacing with the set S˜(sa, ha) can be defined as
B(sa, ha) = {i ∈ T (sa, ha) | Di(1) ∩ S˜(sa, ha) 6= ∅}, (3)
where, for any m ∈ N and any i ∈ V , the set Di(m) denotes
the set of nodes j ∈ V such that d(i, j) = m (i.e., that are
of distance m to node i). Similarly, define
Ŝ :=
{
s ∈ S˜(sa, ha) | ∃δ ∈ N[1,`a+1] : Ds(δ) = B(sa, ha)
∧
⋃
0≤δ′≤δ−1
Ds(δ′) = S˜(sa, ha)
}
. (4)
where `a is the diameter of the subgraph induced by
S˜(sa, ha). Among all the subsets of V that can be picked
by the observer, Ŝ described by (4) is the smallest set that
is guaranteed to include sa. The following results can be
proved.
Theorem 1: pia = 1/|Ŝ|.
Proof: The Bayes’ rule (e.g., see [8]) dictates that
P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} ∝P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa}P{s ∈ Sa}
∝P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa}, (5)
where the notation ∝ shows that the both sides are propor-
tional to each other (i.e., they are equal to each other if one
is multiplied by an appropriate constant). Now, note that
P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa}
= 1∃h∈N:T (s,h)=T (sa,ha)
= 1∃h∈N:B(s,h)=B(sa,ha)∧S˜(sa,ha)=S˜(s,h),
where 1 is a characteristic function, i.e., 1p is equal to
one if the statement p holds true and is equal to zero
otherwise. By definition, B(s, h) = Ds(h+1) and S˜(s, h) =⋃
h′∈N:h′≤hDs(h′). Therefore, it can be deduced that
P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa} = 1s∈Ŝ . (6)
Substituting (6) into (5) gives
P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} ∝ 1s∈Ŝ .
Noting that
∑
s∈V P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} = 1 results in
P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} = 1|Ŝ|1s∈Ŝ .
This concludes the proof.
In this case, it can be proved that E(sa, ha) = {{i, j} ∈
E | i ∈ S˜(sa, ha)∨ j ∈ S˜(sa, ha)}. Hence, Problem 1 can be
cast as
min
0≤ha≤dG
1
|Ŝ|+γa|{{i, j} ∈ E|i ∈ S˜(sa, ha)∨j ∈ S˜(sa, ha)}|,
where dG denotes the diameter of the graph G. For each
sa, this problem can be easily solved by calculating the
cost function for all applicable ha and, subsequently, by
selecting ha corresponding to the smallest value. To calculate
the cost, sets Di(δ) for all i ∈ V and δ need to be
calculated. These sets can be determined by calculating ∆δ
with ∆ denoting the adjacency matrix, i.e., ∆ij = 1 if
there exists an edge {i, j} ∈ G. All these sets for δ upto
dG , can be computed by O(|V|3dG) operations. Noting
that, at worst case dG = O(|V|), all these sets can be
computed by O(|V|4). Therefore, the set Ŝ can be computed
by O(|V|6) operations because, at worst case, |S˜(sa, ha)| =
O(|V|). Finally, to perform all these operations for all ha,
at most O(|V|7) operations are required. These complexity
calculations are very conservative and, for most graphs, much
fewer operations are required.
Alternatively, Problem 2 can be cast as
min
0≤ha≤dG
|{{i, j} ∈ E | i ∈ S˜(sa, ha) ∨ j ∈ S˜(sa, ha)}|,
s.t. |Ŝ| ≥ 1/ξa
Because |{{i, j} ∈ E | i ∈ S˜(sa, ha) ∨ j ∈ S˜(sa, ha)}| is an
increasing function of ha, the optimal solution is to select ha
to be the smallest element of the set {ha | |Ŝ| ≥ 1/ξa}. This
can also be done by checking all ha with at most O(|V|7)
operations.
IV. ASYMMETRIC POLICIES
In the previous section, the only viable family of policies
for agent a is to stop transmitting its position measurements
if its distance in terms of the number of hops to the privacy
sensitive node sa is smaller than or equal to ha. The symme-
try of the policy of the agents was utilized by the observer
to further reduce the uncertainty of predicting the privacy
sensitive node of the agents. This is clearly a drawback
because, for achieving the same level of privacy, an agent that
uses a symmetric policy must exclude a larger subgraph from
its measurements. However, employing symmetric policies
are also advantageous as they can be computed efficiently
and their implementation is simpler than the asymmetric ones
(the agent only needs to count the number of the nodes on
its path).
To formalize this intuition, the set of applicable policies
of the agents is temporarily generalized. Agent a is assumed
to follow a policy that instruct its connected device to stop
broadcasting its position when it is on a link {i, j} if i ∈ Na
or j ∈ Na. It is assumed that sa ∈ Na. Such an assumption
is needed because the observer can deduce that a node is
of special importance to an agent, if it stops there for a
significant amount of time (as it is not only a way point on
the path). The goal is to find the set Na optimally. Similar
to the previous section, an external observer that collects the
position broadcasts of agent a can form the set of nodes
T (sa, ha) ⊆ V in which agent a has transmitted its position.
Clearly, Na = V \ T (sa, ha). The following result can be
proved.
Theorem 2: pia = 1/|Na|.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the Bayes’
rule can be used to show that
P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} ∝P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa}P{s ∈ Sa}
∝P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa}.
Now, note that P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa} = 1s∈Na . Therefore,
P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} = 1|Na|1s∈Na .
This concludes the proof.
Problem 1 can then be cast as
min
Na∈2V :sa∈Na
1
|Na| + γa|{{i, j} ∈ E | i ∈ Na ∨ j ∈ Na}|.
Unfortunately, this optimization problem is very hard solve
as the number of all the possible sets Na ∈ 2V such that
sa ∈ Na grows exponentially with the number of the number
of the nodes. A similar argument can also be presented for
Problem 2 and is thus removed.
If, in order to reduce the complexity of the problem, the
search is conducted on the set of symmetric policies defined
to be set of all policies of the form Na = {s ∈ V | d(s, sa) ≤
ha} for ha ∈ N, the results of the previous section can be
recovered. In this case, it can be also proved that
1
|Na| ≤
1
|Ŝ|
because Ŝ ⊆ S˜(sa, ha) = Na. Therefore, it can be inferred
that the symmetric polices minimize an upper-bound on
the costs over a smaller set of policies, i.e., the set of
asymmetrical policies. This results in their superior efficiency
in terms of computation and implementation.
V. VARYING DENSITY
In most urban areas, the density of the population is not
homogeneous throughout the city. Let ρ : V → R≥0 be
a mapping that determines the density around any node.
Following this observation, the observer can no longer as-
sume a uniform prior on the private nodes. Therefore,
P{s ∈ Sa} = ρ(s)/
∑
v∈V ρ(v). This captures the fact that it
is more likely that the privacy sensitive node sa of agent a to
belong to a densely populated area. In this case, the following
result can be proved.
Theorem 3: pia = ρ(s)/
∑
v∈Ŝ ρ(v).
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, it can be
shown that
P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} ∝P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa}P{s ∈ Sa}
∝P{T (sa, ha) | s ∈ Sa}ρ(s)
=1s∈Ŝρ(s).
As a result,
P{s ∈ Sa | T (sa, ha)} = ρ(s)∑
v∈Ŝ ρ(v)
1s∈Ŝ .
This concludes the proof.
Following the result of Theorem 3, the problems that the
agents need to solve can be adapted and the algorithm in
Section III can be used to find an optimal privacy-preserving
policy.
Note that a “sensible” agent should also put less emphasize
on protecting its privacy if its privacy sensitive node is in a
densely populated area. This is because, in densely populated
areas, even if the observer pinpoints the location of an agent
upto a node, there are many residential and commercial
areas in the surrounding that makes identifying the physical
location of the agent impossible. Such a behaviour can be
reflected in the selection of the term γa (if the agent makes
such a decision).
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ha
0.0
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pia for sa with maximum betweenness
pia for sa with minimum betweenness
ra/|E| for sa with maximum betweenness 
ra/|E| for sa with minimum betweenness 
Fig. 2. pia and ra as a function of ha for nodes with the maximum and
the minimum betweenness averaged over ten random geometric graphs with
1000 nodes in unit rectangle and connectivity radius of 0.1.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
First, the results of Section III are demonstrated on random
graphs. Consider a graph with |V| = 1000 nodes. The
positions of the nodes are distributed uniformly inside a unit
rectangle [0, 1]×[0, 1]. If the Euclidean distance between two
nodes is smaller than or equal to 0.1, the nodes are assumed
to be connected. This creates an undirected graph, which is
referred to as a random geometric graph; see [9] for more
information.
The values of pia and ra (as function of ha) are only
illustrated for the nodes with the maximum and the minimum
betweenness measures (as two extreme behaviours). The
betweenness measure of centrality for a node is defined
as the number of the shortest paths in the graph that pass
through that node divided by the number of all the shortest
paths in the graph. Intuitively, a node with a relatively large
betweenness measure connect many nodes to each other.
However, a node with a small betweenness measure can be
removed from the graph with no devastating consequences.
Fig. 2 shows pia and ra as a function of ha for nodes with the
maximum and the minimum betweenness averaged over ten
random geometric graphs. Based on the illustrated numerical
example, it can be seen that, for the node with the maximum
betweenness, a fairly large ha should be selected to reduce
pia initially. This is because for these nodes the set B(sa, ha)
is very large and thus Ŝ most often contains only a few
nodes. In addition, by increasing ha, ra rapidly increases.
This is because the central nodes are often very close to
all the nodes (as many shortest paths go through them). The
reverse behaviour is observed for the node with the minimum
betweenness.
Transportation networks are most often highly structured
Privacy Sensitive Node
Fig. 3. The roads in the City of Melbourne
10 20 30 40 50 60
ha
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pia
ra/|E| 
Fig. 4. Different values of pia versus the ratio of the nodes where the
location is not reported for different values of ha.
graphs as their design is not random (or at least one hopes)
and follows careful consideration by the local governments.
Therefore, in the next simulation, a scenario in the City of
Melbourne. The goal is to ascertain the achievable levels of
privacy for an agent starting his travel from the dark blue
node9 in Fig. 3. The possible levels of privacy infringement
are depicted in Figure 4. Evidently, with a fairly low ha,
pa can be reduced drastically. This is also achieved at a
relatively low cost because ra is still small.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
An algorithm for finding an optimal policy for preserving
the privacy of the agents in a participatory-sensing scheme
for traffic estimation is presented. The effect of the between-
ness measure of centrality on the policy of the agents is
numerically explored. In can be seen that, for the node with
the maximum betweenness, a fairly large exclusion radius
should be selected to enhance the privacy. In addition, by
slightly increasing radius, the number of the nodes over
9The interest in this node is not arbitrary as it pinpoints the position of
a former residence of one of the authors.
which the agent stop its measurement transmission rapidly
increases. The reverse behaviour is seen for the node with the
minimum betweenness. Finally, note that if the agents want
to hide their position on some edges (denoted by the privacy-
sensitive edges), the same results can be used. To do so, the
definition of the graph representing the transportation system
should be modified. Specifically, to find the optimal policy,
the line graph (see [10, pp. 71–82]) of the transportation
network should be constructed. A line graph of a graph
G = (V, E) is an undirected graph L(G) with the vertex
set VL(G) = E and the edge set EL(G) = {(e, e¯) ∈ VL(G) ×
VL(G) | i = i¯ ∨ j = j¯ for e = {i, j}, e¯ = {¯i, j¯}}. In the line
graph of the transportation, the roads represent the nodes and
two roads are connected to each other by an edge (in the line
graph) if they intersect.
The future work can focus on understanding the effect
of determined policies using simulators for transportation
systems to measure the quality of the participatory-sensing
schemes. Also financial incentives can be designed to
improve the estimation quality in different areas of the city.
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